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Abstract
The ability of diagrams to convey information effectively
comes, in part, from their ability to make facts explicit that
would otherwise need to be inferred. This type of advantage
has often been referred to as a free ride and was deemed to
occur only when a diagram was obtained by translating a
symbolic representation of information. Recent work gen-
eralised free rides, introducing the idea of an observational
advantage, where the existence of such a translation is not
required. In this paper, I will provide an overview of the
theory of observation. It has been shown that Euler dia-
grams without existential import have significant observa-
tional advantages over set theory: they are observationally
complete. I will then explore to what extent Euler diagrams
with existential import are observationally complete with
respect to set-theoretic sentences. In particular, has been
shown that existential import significantly limits the cases
when observational completeness arises, due to the poten-
tial for overspecificity. These two results formally support
Larkin and Simon’s claim that “a diagram is (sometimes)
worth ten thousand words”. The work in this invited paper
is derived from previously published results as cited in the
text.
1. Introduction
The choice of notation in which to represent informa-
tion is an important consideration if the desire is for ef-
fective communication. But, even when a choice has been
made, one must still select from the semantically equivalent
representations of the information to be conveyed. Under-
standing the impact of such choices from the perspective
of human cognition is important. This paper presents an
overview of selected state-of-the-art work on these choices
from a theoretical perspective, summarising results previ-
ously published in [12, 13].
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There are many ways in which visual representations can
be manipulated to impact their effectiveness. For instance,
graphical features, such as colour or size, can be manipu-
lated to enhance or diminish the effectiveness of a represen-
tation [2]. The particular focus of this paper is the recent
work on observational advantages [12], which generalises
prior work on free rides [9]. If we can understand when and
how one representation of information has observational ad-
vantages over another then it allows us to make an informed
choice of representation: we should choose a representation
with many observational advantages.
An example can be seen in Figure 1. Here, five textual
statements convey information about countries visited by
people. They are translated into an Euler diagram which
represents exactly the same information. For instance, the
first textual statement is visualized by the curve labelled
Germany being drawn inside the curve labelled Italy. The
fifth statement is shown by the fact that the curves labelled
Qatar and Sudan do not overlap. From the diagram, one
can simply read off that everyone who visited Germany vis-
ited Qatar but this fact needs to be inferred from the text.
As such, ‘everyone who visited Germany visited Qatar’ is a
free ride from the diagram given the text.
Euler diagrams are not the only notation in which free
rides arise. Figure 2 shows the same textual statements but
this time translated into a semantically equivalent linear di-
agram. Here, lines are used to represent sets and their po-
sitions relative to each other along the x-axis provides in-
formation about subset and disjointness relationships. So,
the information that no one visited both Qatar and Sudan
is shown by the fact that the two corresponding lines do
not overlap. This diagram has exactly the same free rides,
given the associated text, as the Euler diagram in Figure 1.
For instance, since the lines for Germany and Sudan do not
overlap, we can read off that no one visited both Germany
and Sudan, which again must be inferred from the text.
Free rides, in general, are defined to arise only when
one representation of information is derived by systemati-
cally translating another, given, representation of informa-
tion (see [12] for details). By contrast, observational advan-
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SudanQatar Mali
Italy
Everyone who visited Germany visited Italy
Everyone who visited Germany visited Mali
Everyone who visited Italy visited Qatar
Everyone who visited Mali visited Qatar
No one visited both Qatar and Sudan
Germany
Figure 1. Illustrating free rides in Euler dia-
grams.
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Qatar
Germany
Mali
Italy
Everyone who visited Germany visited Italy
Everyone who visited Germany visited Mali
Everyone who visited Italy visited Qatar
Everyone who visited Mali visited Qatar
No one visited both Qatar and Sudan
Figure 2. Illustrating free rides in linear dia-
grams.
tages, of which free rides are examples, only require that
the two representations are semantically equivalent, remov-
ing the need for a translation. Both of them capture the
idea that information which can simply be read off from
one representation but must be inferred from another can
be considered a (potential) advantage of the former over the
latter.
In section 2 we discuss, in more detail, the role of
meaning-carriers and observation, where we look at obser-
vational advantages. Section 3 demonstrates, by example,
how Euler diagrams without existential import (like the ex-
amples we have seen so far) are what is known to be obser-
vationally complete with respect to set-theoretic statements.
When the existential import assumption is introduced, ob-
servational completeness is no longer guaranteed to hold,
demonstrated in section 4. We then conclude in section 5,
where we highlight the need for future work, specifically fo-
cusing on cognition and usability. The main results in this
invited paper are derived from previously published results,
primarily [11, 13].
2. Observation
A formal account of the idea of an observational advan-
tage and, therefore, of free rides, requires a formal definition
of the syntax and semantics of the notations being consid-
ered. Of course, we do not have that for natural language
in general, although the statements given in Figures 1 and 2
are clearly in a controlled form. To ease our exposition,
therefore, we consider versions of these statements in set-
theoretic notation: Germany ⊆ Italy , Germany ⊆ Mali ,
Italy ⊆ Qatar , Mali ⊆ Qatar , and Qatar ∩ Sudan = ∅.
Each of these five statements1 express the desired informa-
tion. What is important here is that each statement has a
single meaning-carrying relationship.
This idea of a meaning-carrying relationship is at the
heart of how free rides and observational advantages are de-
fined. So what is a meaning-carrying relationship? Well, it
is taken to be a relation on the syntax of a representation
that evaluates to either ‘true’ or ‘false’ when the syntax is
given meaning. Therefore, a meaning-carrier is similar to a
‘representing fact’ in Shin’s work [10]. Why, then, do each
of the five set-theoretic statements have a single meaning-
carrying relationship? Consider Germany ⊆ Italy , which
is either true or false, depending on the sets represented by
Germany and Italy . The meaning-carrying relationship is
that Germany is written to the left of ⊆ and Italy to the
right. Similarly, the fifth statement’s meaning carrier is that
Qatar ∩ Sudan is written to the left of = and ∅ is on the
right.
What, then, are the meaning-carrying relationships in the
Euler and linear diagrams? Each diagram is a single state-
ment but they have many meaning-carrying relationships.
The Euler diagram in Figure 1 uses curve containment to ex-
press the four subset statements. For the two curves arising
from Germany ⊆ Italy , we see that the one is inside the
other and the assertion made by the diagram is true when-
ever the set represented by Germany is a subset of that rep-
resented by Italy , otherwise it is false. So, one example of
a meaning-carrying relationship is the containment of one
curve by another. Likewise, the Euler diagram uses non-
overlapping curves to express the disjointness of sets.
In addition to the five meaning-carrying relationships
corresponding to the five textual statements, we have
further meaning-carrying relationships, such as the non-
overlapping of the Mali and Sudan curves which expresses
that no one visited both Mali and Sudan. Thus, from the
1A statement is a syntactic entity (in any representation system) that
represents some information. For example, a set-theoretic sentence is a
single statement, and so is an Euler diagram.
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Euler diagram we can observe thatMali∩Sudan = ∅ but we
must infer this from the set-theoretic statements. In the lin-
ear diagram, Figure 2, the statements that can be observed
are the same as those that can be observed from the Eu-
ler diagram, even though their syntax is different and their
meaning-carriers are therefore identified in a different way.
The presence of multiple meaning-carrying relationships
suggests that, as compared to representation systems with
single-meaning carrying relationship, facts can sometimes
be observed to be true rather than inferred to be true. Rep-
resentations of information that allow statements to be ob-
served as true, without the need for inference, can be con-
sidered advantageous. Here we must be clear, though, that
this difference between single and multiple meaning carri-
ers should not suggest a dichotomy of sentential and dia-
grammatic notations. Merely, the examples we have pre-
sented contrast symbolic and diagrammatic representations
where the former has single meaning-carriers and the latter
has multiple meaning-carriers.
So, we have seen that meaning-carriers can lead to infor-
mation being observed as true from representations of in-
formation. The concept of observation has been considered
in proof systems, where it was formalized as an inference
rule [1, 14]. To give the idea, an inference rule based on
observation allows one to identify pieces of information ex-
pressed in a statement and re-express them in another state-
ment. As we have already seen, many sentences support
precisely one meaning-carrying relationship. In such cases,
if we were to define and apply an observation inference
rule, it would merely restate the information in an identical,
or semantically equivalent sentence. By contrast, in sys-
tems where single statements have many meaning-carriers,
such as some diagrammatic representations, using meaning-
carriers to apply an observation inference rule can yield
many different statements. This suggests that the role of
observation is important when considering inference prob-
lems.
One example where observation has been used is Bar-
wise and Etchemendy’s Hyperproof system [1]. Moreover,
Swoboda and Allwein [14] included both an observation
rule and other inference rules in their work. They called
for the distinctive treatment of the observation rule, which
consists of visual perception and the restatement of the in-
formation thus obtained. This draws on Dretske’s classi-
fication of various cases that are commonly described as
“somebody’s seeing that something is the case” [5].
It is necessary to define meaning-carriers and the notion
of observation in the context of the syntax and semantics of
notations; what it means to be a meaning-carrier is clearly
determined by the syntax and semantics. However, if we
assume such definitions are given, we can proceed define
what it means to be an observational advantage. Firstly,
we require that if we observe a statement, σo, from another
statement, σ then the following properties must hold:
1. some of the meaning-carrying relationships holding in
σ also hold in σo, and
2. σo supports just enough relationships to express the
meanings carried by the selected relationships in σ and
nothing stronger [12].
These properties ensure that σo is semantically entailed by
σ.
Suppose now that we have the more general case of a
set of statements, Σ, from which we wish to observe infor-
mation: the only meaning-carrying relationships in Σ are
derived from the statements in Σ. So, the only statements
observable from Σ must be observable from one of the state-
ments in Σ. This leads us to be able to define the notion of
observation from a set of statements.
Definition 1 Let Σ be a finite set of statements and σo be a
single statement. Then σo is observable from Σ iff σo is ob-
servable from some statement, σ, in Σ. The set of statements
that are observable from Σ is denoted O(Σ) [12].
Now we have understood what it means to be observ-
able, we can define what it means to be an observational
advantage. Intuitively, an observational advantage occurs
when we have two semantically equivalent representations
of information, say two sets of statements, Σ and Σˆ. If we
can observe a statement from Σˆ but not from Σ then it is an
advantage of Σˆ over Σ. This is captured by definition 2.
Definition 2 Let Σ and Σˆ be finite, semantically equivalent
sets of statements. Let σ be a statement. If
1. σ is not observable from Σ, and
2. σ is observable from Σˆ
then σ is an observational advantage of Σˆ given Σ. The
set of all observational advantages of Σˆ given Σ is denoted
OA(Σˆ,Σ) [12].
To finish this section, we consider two extreme cases
where observational advantages can arise, or even fail to
do so. Firstly, suppose given a set of statements, Σ, there
is some information, captured by a set, Σ, of statements,
whose truth we want to establish. If we can simply read-off
(observe) all of the respective statements in Σ then Σ can
be considered observationally complete:
Definition 3 Let Σ and Σ be finite sets of statements.
Then Σ is observationally complete with respect to Σ if
Σ ⊆ O(Σ) [12].
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Lastly, we have the other extreme case: if we cannot sim-
ply read-off (observe) any of the respective statements, then
Σ can be considered observationally devoid:
Definition 4 Let Σ and Σ be finite sets of statements.
Then Σ is observationally devoid with respect to Σ if
Σ ∩ O(Σ) = ∅ [12].
These two extreme cases allow us to formally establish
when one representation has numerous advantages over an-
other. This occurs when, say, Σ is observationally complete,
yet Σˆ is observationally devoid with respect to a given Σ.
3. Observational Advantages of Euler Dia-
grams without Existential Import
Euler diagrams have substantial observational advan-
tages over set-theoretic statements. For our purposes, we
consider set-theoretic expressions of the form s1 ∩ s2,
s1 ∪ s2, s1\s2 and s1 as well as the special symbols U (the
universal set) and ∅ (the empty set). We can then form set-
theoretic statements using these expressions. The following
are the set-theoretic statements that we consider: s1 ⊆ s2
and s1 = s2. This allows a rich variety of information about
sets to be expressed. What is important here is that given
any finite collection of set-theoretic statements, there exists
a semantically equivalent Euler diagram (without existential
import).
As an example, consider the following set-theoretic
statements:
1. no one visited both Sudan and Vietnam:
Sudan ∩Vietnam = ∅
2. no one visited both Denmark and Vietnam:
Denmark ∩Vietnam = ∅
3. everyone who visited Denmark visited France:
Denmark ⊆ France
4. everyone who visited Libya visited Sudan:
Libya ⊆ Sudan
5. no one visited both France and Libya:
France ∩ Libya = ∅.
France
Denmark
Libya
SudanVietnam
Figure 3. Observational completeness.
A semantically equivalent Euler diagram (without existen-
tial import) can be seen in Figure 3.
We have already seen some examples of set-theoretic
statements that are observable from Euler diagrams. In this
particular case, one observable statement is
Vietnam ∩ Libya = ∅
as well as the equivalent statement Libya ∩ Vietnam = ∅.
More complex set-theoretic statements are also observable,
such as
(Denmark ∪ Libya) ∩Vietnam = ∅.
Why can this more complex statement be observed? Well,
here we must consider the regions formed by the curves.
The region, comprising three zones, formed by the interiors
of the curves for Denmark and Libya is disjoint from (shares
no points with) the region inside the Vietnam curve. Thus,
the disjointness of two regions is a meaning-carrier in Euler
diagrams. The presence of this meaning-carrier shows that
we can observe (Denmark ∪ Libya) ∩Vietnam = ∅ from
the diagram.
Consider, then, the types of set-theoretic expressions to
which we have access, in the context of our example:
1. Each ‘basic’ set-expression (i.e. one that does not in-
volve intersection, union, difference or complement)
corresponds to a region inside a curve. In our exam-
ple, there are five basic set-expressions: Denmark ,
France , Libya , Sudan , and Vietnam . We say, infor-
mally, that these basic set-expressions correspond to
regions in the diagram.
2. Given any two set–expressions, s1 and s2, that corre-
spond to regions in the diagram, the set-expressions
s1 ∩ s2, s1 ∪ s2, s1\s2, and s1 also correspond to re-
gions in the diagram (noting that ‘empty’ regions con-
tain no points). For example, Denmark ∪ France ,
Denmark∩France , Sudan\France andLibya all cor-
respond to regions.
Using this insight, it is easy to see that any set-expression
that can be formed from the basic ones corresponds to some
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region in the diagram. Therefore, from the diagram, given
any set-theoretic statement of the form s1 ⊆ s2, there are
corresponding regions for s1 and s2. We can the observe
s1 ⊆ s2 from the diagram precisely when the region, r1 for
s1 is a subset (contained by) the region for s2. Likewise, if
r1 = r2 then we can observe s1 = s2. This insight leads us
to the following theorem, which is derived from one of the
main results in [12]:
Theorem 1 Let S = {s1, ..., sn} be a finite set of set-
theoretic statements. Then there exists an Euler diagram,
d, where:
1. d semantically equivalent to S, and
2. given any set-theoretic statement, s, that is formed
from set-expressions whose basic sets are all used in
S and which is semantically entailed by S can be ob-
served from d.
In other words, d is observationally complete with re-
spect to the set, S, of all statements that we can infer from
S. But, on the other hand, what can be observed from S?
Well, since the set-theoretic statements in S only have one
meaning carrier, S is observationally devoid, given S\S.
This means that the Euler diagram has maximal observa-
tional advantage over S and these result tells us that Euler
diagrams are powerful representations of information com-
pared to set-theoretic statements.
4. Observational Advantages of Euler Dia-
grams with Existential Import
Euler diagrams that do not enforce existential import,
which have been the focus up to this point, allow regions
in the diagram to represent empty sets. For instance, in Fig-
ure 3, there is no information that anyone at all visited Viet-
nam (or the other countries). There are occasions, of course,
when we want to enforce the non-emptiness of sets (or,
more generally, provide cardinality information, but that is
beyond the scope of this discussion). Euler diagrams can be
extended in various was to achieve this.
For instance, Peirce denotes the non-emptiness of a set
with ⊗-sequences [8], also used by Shin [10] and further
developed by Choudhury and Chakraborty [4]. By contrast,
Euler diagrams with existential import [3] do not require ad-
ditional syntax to assert the non-emptiness of a set: all zones
are taken to represent non-empty sets (so, any region formed
by the curves represents a non-empty set) [6]. The extension
of the semantics to require that zones represent non-empty
sets leads to an obvious question: are Euler diagrams with
existential import still observationally complete?
To answer this question, we need to consider a wider
variety of set-theoretic statements, even though the use of
intersection, union, difference and complement for forming
set-expressions is still appropriate and sufficient. This is,
obviously, because using just ⊆ and = does not lead to as-
sertions about non-emptiness. Therefore, we also allow the
use of * and 6=. Using these two additional operators, we
can form statements like Vietnam 6= ∅ and Denmark *
Sudan (so implying that Denmark\Sudan 6= ∅).
Sudan
France
Botswana
Oman
Germany
Figure 4. An Euler diagram interpreted under
existential import semantics.
Consider, now, the Euler diagram in Figure 4 under the
existential import assumption. Can we find a set of set-
theoretic sentences that capture the meaning conveyed by
this diagram? There are four statements corresponding to
the set-theoretic relationships expressible using ⊆ and =
(noting that other statements could be written down too, but
they would not convey extra subset or equality information):
1. everyone who visited Botswana visited France and
Germany:
Botwana ⊆ France ∩Germany ,
2. everyone who Germany visited Oman:
Germany ⊆ Oman,
3. no one visited both Oman and Sudan:
Oman ∩ Sudan = ∅,
and
4. no one visited both France and Sudan:
France ∩ Sudan = ∅.
However, these statements alone are not semantically equiv-
alent to the Euler diagram under the existential import as-
sumption, since each zone represents a non-empty set. We
need a further seven statements to achieve semantic equiva-
lence (again, different choices of statements exist - there are
non-unique sets of set-theoretic statements that are seman-
tically equivalent to the diagram):
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1. at least one person visited Oman only:
Oman∩Botswana∩France∩Germany∩Sudan 6= ∅,
2. at least one person visited France only:
France∩Botswana∩Germany∩Oman∩Sudan 6= ∅,
3. at least one person visited Sudan only:
Sudan∩Botswana∩France∩Germany∩Oman 6= ∅,
4. at least one person visited both Germany and Oman,
but no other country:
Germany∩Oman∩Botswana∩France∩Sudan 6= ∅,
5. at least one person visited both France and Oman, but
no other country:
France∩Oman∩Botswana∩Germany∩Sudan 6= ∅,
6. at least one person visited all of France, Germany and
Oman, but no other country:
France∩Germany∩Oman∩Botswana∩Sudan 6= ∅,
and
7. at least one person visited all of Botswana, France,
Germany and Oman:
Botswana ∩ France ∩Germany ∩Oman 6= ∅,
Notice that the last statement does not involve all five sets.
This is sufficient because we know that the set specified by
the four-way intersection is disjoint from Sudan (which fol-
lows from the earlier statements). We could, instead, have
chosen the set-theoretic sentence
Botswana ∩ France ∩Germany ∩Oman ∩ Sudan 6= ∅.
This illustrates how choice of statements can arise, when
seeking semantic equivalence.
As with Euler diagrams without existential import, we
can observe information from the diagram that needs to be
inferred from the set-theoretic statements. For instance, any
region represents a non-empty set, so we can observe that
Oman 6= ∅ and France ∩ Oman 6= ∅. We can further
observe that Oman * France . Many other statements can
be observed too. In fact, this diagram is observationally
complete with respect to the set of set-theoretic sentences
that are given in the two lists above.
What should be evident from this example is that given
an arbitrary set of set-theoretic statements there need not
exist a semantically equivalent Euler diagram. For instance,
the first five statements, focusing on subset and equality,
cannot be translated into a semantically equivalent Euler
diagram with existential import. If we were to attempt to
produce such diagram it would be that in Figure 4, but we
know that this expresses more information than those five
statements alone.
The problem here arises because of overspecificity. Un-
fortunately, due to overspecificity, there are numerous sets
of set-theoretic sentences where no semantically equivalent
Euler diagram with existential import exists. This indicates
a problematic situation: diagrams are typically believed to
excel as representations of information due to their ability to
make facts explicit that would otherwise need to be inferred.
But, as a positive, what we can take away from this discus-
sion is that, given a finite set of set-theoretic sentences, if
there exists a semantically equivalent Euler diagram with
existential import then that diagram is observationally com-
plete [13]2.
5. Conclusion
It has been seen, though a consideration of Euler dia-
grams under varying semantic conventions, that sometimes
they are capable of representing information in an observa-
tionally complete way. The incorporation of existential im-
port brings with it increased expressiveness but at a price:
overspecificity means that often information cannot be ex-
pressed appropriately. The results support Larkin and Si-
mon’s claim that “a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thou-
sand words” [7].
The theoretical characterisation of what it means to be
observable, via meaning-carriers, and the subsequent con-
sideration of observational completeness, is driven by a de-
sire to understand what makes diagrams cognitively more
effective than symbolic or textual representations. Now
that such theory has been developed, it is important to
conduct empirical studies to ascertain the relationship be-
tween observational advantages and cognitive advantages.
Are observational advantages really helpful? That is, do
people extract information more effectively from a repre-
sentation with an observational advantage over another, or
does the process of inference lead to more effective task
performance? Assuming that observational advantages do
bring cognitive benefit, is there a way of modelling the rela-
tive cognitive benefit of some observational advantages over
others? This latter question is inspired by the fact that some
set-theoretic statements are likely to be more readily ob-
servable, by people, from a diagram than others.
2The conditions under which this happens are non-trivial and so omit-
ted.
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